




Diversity on British boards and personal traits that impact career progression from
AIM towards FTSE 100
Mateus, Cesario; Mateus, Irina Bezhentseva; Stojanovic, Alex
Published in:
Corporate Ownership and Control







Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Mateus, C., Mateus, I. B., & Stojanovic, A. (2020). Diversity on British boards and personal traits that impact
career progression from AIM towards FTSE 100. Corporate Ownership and Control, 17(4), 183-199.
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i4art15
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 17, Issue 4, Summer 2020 
 
183 
DIVERSITY ON BRITISH BOARDS AND 
PERSONAL TRAITS THAT IMPACT 
CAREER PROGRESSION FROM AIM 




, Irina Mateus 
**
, Alex Stojanovic 
*** 
 
* Corresponding author, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark 
Contact details: Aalborg University, Fibigerstræde 2-32, 9220 Aalborg East, Denmark 
** Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark 





The average remuneration of FTSE 100 chief 
executives is 160 times the average UK salary 
(Steiner, 2017). Excessive remuneration packages are 
expected to reflect unique personal attributes of top 
board members and should vary among different 
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This study proposes a new approach to examining executive 
remuneration and manager characteristics disaggregated by 
market index peer clusters and analyses personal attributes that 
differentiate managers across companies of different market caps 
(proxied my market indices such as FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 
SmallCap, and AIM). Our sample is composed of biographical data 
on 790 executive directors from 125 UK financial firms covering a 
2004-2016 time period. The results show that network and 
education are the most important factors for career progression. 
On average, FTSE 100 executive directors are three times better 
connected and two times better educated than FTSE SmallCap and 
AIM board members. The larger the firm, the more diverse the 
board with more international (non-British) and female directors 
(even though male executives mostly dominate). The higher 
position is associated with greater age, while new executives tend 
to be younger and better connected. We highlight a change in the 
new managers‟ skill-set after the financial crisis which may 
presumably be explained by risk aversion. New directors 
appointed after 2008 are, on average, older and better educated. 
Even though after the crisis we document that all the 
boardrooms, except FTSE SmallCap, appear to have become more 
gender diverse, the female presence in the boards is scarce and 
the highest number of women was mainly employed during the 
financial crisis. After 2008, British boards have become less 
nationality diverse. Thus, for the purpose of maintaining 
companies‟ competitive advantage in increasingly diverse 
markets, it requires further attention from policy regulators.  
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that differentiate members of top executive boards 
from other hierarchy boards? What are the personal 
characteristics that drive career progression and 
raise executive pay? The FRC UK reports (2016, 
2018) and Parker (2017) emphasise the importance 
of recruiting board directors from a diverse pool. 
They state that as the composition of the society in 
the UK has changed over the past forty years, 
boardrooms of Britain‟s leading companies are 
expected to become more diverse to reflect the 
make-up of society and have a more diversified 
talent pool to survive in the competitive market. 
However, has the composition of the British boards 
changed over time? Are they in fact gender and 
nationality diverse? 
In this paper, we aim to investigate the 
personal characteristics of executive directors in the 
British boardrooms which impact executive pay. We 
assess whether there are some personal traits that 
drive career progression from AIM (Alternative 
Investment Market) towards FTSE 100 companies 
and whether those traits (hiring requirements) have 
changed after the financial crisis. The analysis is 
conducted for new entries and existing members 
and shows whether diversity structure in the boards 
of Britain‟s companies has changed/improved over 
time.  
The major strand of academic literature has 
analysed CEO/corporate board characteristics and 
its impact on firm performance and corporate 
policies (Malmendier & Tate, 2005; Ben-David, 
Graham, & Harvey, 2013, Serfling, 2014; Jermias & 
Gani, 2014; Mateus, C., Mateus, B. I., & Hall, 2015; 
Belhaj & Mateus, 2016; Fernandes, Farinha, Martins, 
& Mateus, 2017, 2018). A significant strand of 
academic research has examined the relationship 
between CEO/board members‟ characteristics and 
executive pay. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) have 
researched the direct influence of firm and 
manager-fixed effects on executive compensation 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Demerjian, Lev, & McVay, 
2012). Nguyen, Hagendorff, and Eshraghi (2014) find 
that age, education, and the prior work experience of 
executives create shareholder wealth while gender is 
not linked to measurable value effects. Falato, Li, 
and Milbourn (2015) state that CEO talent (proxied 
by media coverage, age at which an executive 
becomes a CEO, and educational background) 
represents an important determinant of pay.  
Recent studies have highlighted that firm‟s 
benchmark against peers in order to determine 
executive pay (Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2008; 
Faulkender & Yang, 2010; Albuquerque, De Franco, & 
Verdi, 2013; Skovoroda & Bruce, 2017). These 
studies have shown that firms tend to choose peers 
of similar size, profitability, performance, and 
business complexity. Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen 
(2011) find that firms use benchmarking or peer 
groups to determine the levels of executives‟ salary, 
bonus, and option awards. Thus, firms in the 
S&P 500 are more likely to choose other S&P 500 
firms as peers.  
Based on the above and the research of Linck 
Netter, and Yang (2008), Falato Li, and Milbourn 
(2015) who state that firm size is an important 
determinant of board structure and executive pay, 
we propose a novel approach of examining executive 
remuneration and manager characteristics 
disaggregated by market index peer clusters. We 
claim that the standard approach of measuring 
executive remuneration by estimating the 
aggregation of salary, annual bonus, stock awards, 
stock options, and restricted shares do not account 
for the other benefits and perks provided by the 
position, i.e. retirement benefits and pensions, free 
club memberships, corporate accommodation and 
security, corporate cars/aircraft, free tax preparation 
and financial counselling attributed to the executive 
rank. Therefore, we analyse board member personal 
characteristics associated with the executive pay 
among market index peer groups and identify 
personal attributes important for career progression 
from AIM firms towards FTSE 100.  
This work adds to the previous literature on 
board characteristics and composition by analysing 
personal attributes that differentiate managers 
across companies of different market cap (proxied 
my market indices such as FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 
SmallCap, and AIM). It highlights managerial traits 
important for hiring decisions and provides insights 
on how the characteristics of executive directors 
change across different company hierarchies, and 
over time. Furthermore, we investigate whether UK 
top companies‟ boards comply with the FRC UK 
Code guidance on gender and ethnic diversity (also 
highlighted in the final report of the Parker Review 
Committee (Parker, 2017).  
To examine the difference in managerial traits 
across different peer group boards, we split the 
complete detailed biographical data among 790 
executive directors from 125 financial firms 
collected from BoardEx for the time period 
2004-2016 into four major groups (market index 
clusters) – the AIM market, FTSE SmallCap, FTSE 250 
and FTSE 100 – in accordance with the UK stock 
market index to which each firm belongs. To 
conduct our analysis, we apply the ordered probit 
model to the biographical data on board members 
and identify the most important for managerial 
labour market board characteristics that 
differentiate executive directors across index 
categories. The analysis of the personal traits is then 
performed for existing board members and new 
entries and controls for the change in executive 
attributes after the financial crisis. 
To our knowledge, only a few existing studies 
have analysed executive characteristics and abilities 
for career advancement. For instance, Murphy and 
Zabojnik (2004) propose a model that helps to 
explain a CEO‟s external-internal hiring choice as a 
trade-off between matching and firm-specific skills. 
Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) study the 
characteristics and abilities of CEO candidates for 
companies involved in buyout and venture capital 
transactions, relating them to hiring decisions and 
company performance. The research of Schoar and 
Zuo (2017) reveals the economic conditions when 
managers enter the labour market and have long-run 
effects on their career paths and managerial styles.  
Our results show that network and education 
are the most important attributes both in terms of 
„corporate hierarchy‟ (including executive pay) and 
new board member appointments. An additional 
degree qualification raises the chances of being on 
an FTSE 100 board by 5-10 per cent and improves 
the chances of being on the board of an FTSE 350 
financial company by about 20 per cent. A similar 
pattern persists for network connections.  
The average characteristics of the new entries 
differ from the existing board. A „typical‟ new 
director is younger and much better connected. 
Those appointed after 2008 are, on average, older 
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and hold more degrees (except FTSE SmallCap 
group). This may indicate the evidence of risk 
aversion consistent with Berger, Kick, and Schaeck 
(2014) who states that older and highly educated 
executive directors reduce the risk of financial 
institutions. In line with previous literature on 
female risk aversion (Carter, Franco, & Gine, 2017; 
Martin, Nishikawa, & Williams, 2009; Mulcahy & 
Linehan, 2014), after the crisis, all boardrooms 
appear to be more gender diverse. However, the 
fraction of new female directors is scarce and the 
majority of them were predominantly employed 
during the financial crisis. As a warning sign we 
document that, except in the AIM category, the UK 
boardrooms became less nationality diverse after 
2008. Our evidence shows that the larger the firm, 
the more educated and connected board members, 
and the more diverse the board with more 
international (non-British) and female directors.  
This paper contributes to the discussions on 
what makes better boards (Ben‐Amar, Francoeur, 
Hafsi, & Labelle, 2013) and expands upon the 
previous literature on managerial traits, the quality 
of board governance and UK board composition 
(O‟Sullivan & Diacon, 2003; Dahya & McConnell, 
2007; Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 2011). It highlights 
executive characteristics important for hiring 
decisions and identifies personal attributes that 
differentiate the board of FTSE 100 from FTSE 
SmallCap and AIM market firms. This study is of 
interest to policymakers and regulatory boards as 
the results show that despite the FRC (2016) UK 
boards are not well gender and nationality diverse. 
Our novel approach of using market indices to 
define managerial peer groups can be used in 
further research on remuneration benchmarking.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. 
The next section describes the rationale for the 
variables selection, background literature, and 
research expectations. Section 3 explains the data 
sample and variables construction. Section 4 
presents the methodology and empirical results, 
while Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 
EXPECTATIONS 
 
A different board capability set will result in 
different decision-making and organisational 
outcomes. Therefore, a balance of the elements of 
board intellectual capital is required for carrying 
out a series of roles. Depending on the nature of 
these roles, the requirements for the different 
echelon executive directors may vary. The academic 
literature highlights that selection of the right 
executive directors with the desired characteristics 
for the role is crucial as it will have an impact on 
board effectiveness and the governance outputs of 
organisational performance (Nicholson & Kiel, 
2004).  
The existing literature emphasises the various 
factors in which potential employers might be 
interested. Fracassi and Tate (2012) highlight that 
network connections between management and 
potential directors influence director selection. A 
recent study of Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster 
(2015) shows that higher network activity of 
executive directors conveys to larger compensation 
figures. Shue‟s (2013) study shows that executive 
peer networks are important determinants of 
managerial decision-making and firm policies. 
Based on the above, we hypothesise that director 
network size is one of the main attributes in hiring 
decisions. Therefore, it is expected that highly 
connected executive directors have higher chances 
to be hired in FTSE 250 and FTSE 100 firms. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The larger the firm, the 
more connected board members. 
Some literature on CEO-specific heterogeneity 
documents the impact of education on corporate 
decision making. Sitthipongpanich and Polsiri 
(2015) claim that CEO educational background is 
one of the key determinants of firm policies and is 
essential to management appointments. Smith, N., 
Smith, V., and Verner (2006) document that 
education is a major factor considered by firms 
when appointing a CEO. Hitt and Tyler (1991) and 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that executives‟ 
level of education and educational background 
affect firm strategic decisions. Following this 
intuition, we believe that education is a factor that 
differentiates the managers of FTSE 100 from FTSE 
SmallCap and AIM market firms. In other words, we 
expect the top directors in FTSE 250, and in 
particular, the FTSE 100, to be the most qualified. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The larger the firm, the 
more educated board members. 
The next factor that we intend to test is Age. 
Thus, Yim (2013) highlights that age has one of the 
main impacts on corporate policies. Similarly, 
Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2009) state 
that the sophistication of financial decisions varies 
with age. Some literature suggests that age can 
reflect greater experience and skills 
(Sitthipongpanich & Polsiri, 2015). Furthermore, 
Shefrin (2005) provides evidence that personal risk-
aversion appears to increase with age up until 70 
years and then declines. Thereby, we suppose that 
top managers of the largest companies are older. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): A higher position is 
associated with greater age. 
FRC (2017) and Parker (2017) emphasised the 
importance of ethnic and gender diversity in board 
leadership. It has been noted that UK boards 
should represent the society we live in and reflect 
international markets in which they operate. Thus, 
boards need to improve ethnic and gender diversity 
further to reflect their employee base and the 
communities they serve. Similarly, the work of 
Ben-Amar et al. (2013) discusses the need for a 
balanced board diversity that best serves the firm‟s 
purpose and obligations. Following these calls, we 
will then seek to analyse the current diversity 
levels in UK boardrooms and its historical changes. 
As has been previously documented (Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2004; Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin, 
2007) the presence of women in top UK 
boardrooms is scarce. However, the academic 
literature suggests that having women on corporate 
boards is beneficial to the shareholders. For 
instance, the study of Huang and Kisgen (2013) 
shows that men exhibit comparative 
overconfidence in significant corporate decision-
making compared with women (Barber & Odean, 
2001). The positive impact of gender diversity on 
board effectiveness in terms of its monitoring role 
and the quality of its decisions was highlighted in 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), Nielsen and Huse 
(2010). According to Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 
(2003), the proportion of women and minorities on 
boards increases with firm size and board size but 
decreases as the number of insiders increases. We 
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believe that the proportion of women on board 
among the index clusters (AIM, FTSE SmallCap, 
FTSE 250, and FTSE 100) may both vary and enlarge 
presumably in larger and more internationally 
diverse firms. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Boards in larger firms are 
more gender diverse. 
In addition, we want to analyse whether 
nationality diversity among executive directors 
differ between the top and bottom of market cap 
companies. The existing literature has documented 
a positive relationship between top management 
team nationality diversity and firm performance 
(Nielsen, B. B., & Nielsen, S., 2013). Another strand 
of academic literature states that nationality plays 
an important role in managerial attributes and 
decision-making processes (Estélyi & Nisar, 2016). 
Moreover, Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) find US 
CEOs differ significantly from non-US CEOs in 
terms of their underlying attitudes. In line with 
Hahn and Lasfer (2016) who affirm that large listed 
companies are not necessarily listed in the country 
of origin and, in general, have a higher proportion 
of foreign directors, we would expect the boards of 
FTSE 250 and FTSE 100 to be more nationally 
diverse in relation to those in AIM and FTSE 
SmallCap firms. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Boards in larger firms are 
more nationality diverse. 
 
3. DATA SOURCES, SAMPLE AND VARIABLES 
DEFINITION 
 
3.1. Data and sample construction 
 
To test our main hypotheses, we use the data on 
executive directors‟ characteristics and personal 
connections collected from BoardEx database, which 
provides detailed biographical information on 
directors and top executives of public and private 
companies as well as not-for-profit organisations 
around the world. Our sample includes all the UK 
listed financial firms (banks, insurance, investment 
companies, life assurance, etc.) and executive 
directors as per database. In total, the sample 
comprises 125 unique financial firms and 790 
unique executive directors and covers the period 
2004-20161.  
To analyse the personal attributes of boards 
across companies of different sizes (market 
capitalisation), firms are clustered by major UK 
market indices, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap, 
and AIM firms. The FTSE 100 index comprises the 
100 most highly capitalised blue-chip companies, 
representing approximately 81% of the UK market. 
The FTSE 250 index includes mid-capitalised 
companies not covered by the FTSE 100 and 
represents approximately 15% of UK market 
capitalisation. The FTSE SmallCap consists of 
companies outside of the FTSE 350 Index and 
represents approximately 2% of UK market 
capitalisation. AIM (Alternative Investment Market) 
is a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange, 
allowing smaller companies to float shares with a 
more flexible regulatory system than is applicable to 
the main market.  
                                                          
1 The sample is composed of 125 financial firm as we upgrade the database in 
a year basis since 2003, both for the numbers of firms (IPOs, Delisting, etc.) 
and indices. For instance, we control and upgrade the database if firms move 
from FTSE SmallCap to FTSE 250. 
Thus, for each year, we control for the number 
of firms and index composition and account for the 
firms that have left, entered, or changed the index 
cluster (no survivorship bias). Table 1 provides a 
summary of the firms present in each index cluster 
(as the number of firms does not vary significantly 
across years, the table displays the total number of 
firms in each cluster for every four years). Table 2 
shows the number of unique directors in each 
cluster and for every year. 
 
3.2. Indices and executive compensation 
 
One recent strand of academic literature states that 
firms are more likely to benchmark against peers 
when determining executive pay (Bizjak, Lemmon, & 
Naveen, 2008; Faulkender & Yang, 2010; 
Albuquerque, De Franco, & Verdi, 2013). The peers 
are usually the firms of a similar size, profitability, 
and business complexity. Thus, for instance, Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Nguyen, (2011) explain that firms in 
the S&P 500 are more likely to choose other S&P 500 
firms as peers. Further, Gabaix and Landier (2008) 
claim that the increase in executive pay can be fully 
attributed to the increase in market capitalisation.  
Based on the evidence 1) that executive pay of 
top managers is benchmarked against peers and 
differentiate by firm market capitalisation, 2) that 
the determinants of board structure differ between 
small and large firms (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008) 
and 3) the evidence of a complementary relation 
between pay for top executive credentials and firm 
size (Falato & Milbourn, 2015), we claim that the 
difference in executive pay and the top paid 
manager characteristics should be clearly seen when 
analysed in respect to market index peer groups 
such as FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap and AIM 
firms. Market index clustering will allow controlling 
for complete remuneration packages, including extra 
perks associated with the executive rank and gives 
the opportunity to analyse manager characteristics 
important for career growth (from AIM towards 
FTSE 100): the personal traits that differentiate 
executive directors across different company 
hierarchies.  
To confirm the above, we analyse remuneration 
of executive boards with respect to the four 
aforementioned market index categories. Figure 1 
shows the average firm compensation/remuneration 
in each index cluster (salaries + bonus) across the 
years. One can observe that the executive directors‟ 
pay varies significantly depending on peer 
categories. Thus, FTSE 100 firms pay higher average 
salary/bonus than FTSE 250 counterparts. The same 
applies to FTSE 250 pay in comparison to FTSE 
SmallCap and stands for the latter in comparison to 
AIM firms. Figure 2 reports the average firm 
executive directors‟ total wealth estimated as a sum 
of the value of cumulative holdings over time of 
stock, options (value of total shares held + estimated 
market value of options held) and the value of LTIP 
(long term incentive plan) held by the executive 
directors across the years. It clearly confirms that 
the executive compensation across index clusters 
significantly varies. The highest difference in 
executive wealth is pronounced for FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 firms. 
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Table 1. Financial firms 
 
Sample/Firms Financials 2016 2012 2008 2004 Unique firms 
FTSE 100 10 10 10 9 10 
FTSE 250 24 26 25 22 27 
FTSE SmallCap 16 15 12 9 17 
AIM market 50 64 64 26 71 
Total 100 115 111 66 125 
 







2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
FTSE 100 98 30 29 35 35 33 36 38 41 39 41 39 42 45 
FTSE 250 178 59 46 71 71 85 93 81 83 92 98 96 91 93 
FTSE 
SmallCap 
92 39 25 40 41 40 42 44 42 41 41 41 39 37 
AIM 422 138 100 174 181 182 197 193 178 195 206 159 153 104 
Total 790 266 200 320 328 340 368 356 344 367 386 335 325 279 
 








We claim that the difference in executive 
compensation should be attributed to those most 
valued according to their employer managerial 
traits. Recent research (Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 
2013; Crespí-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 2015) show 
that larger compensations of executive managers are 
linked to higher network activity. In this paper, we 
are determined to extend the previous work and aim 
to identify additional personal characteristics that 
differentiate managers across firms of different 
market cap and specify the most important traits for 
career progression (from AIM firms towards 
FTSE 100). 
 
3.3. Variables definition and descriptive statistics 
 
To test our main hypotheses and control for the 
difference in managerial attributes in each index 
group, we utilise five variables: 












2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year 
Compensation ( Financials/Executive directors) 










2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year 
Wealth (Financials/Executive directors) 
AIM FTSE SmallCAp FTSE250 FTSE100
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Network size information provided by BoardEx and 
represents the number of director connections 
(number of overlaps through employment, 
education, and other activities (i.e. connections 
through clubs, memberships, non-profit activities, 
etc.).  
2. Variable “Education”, represents the number 
of qualifications held by the director. We account for 
all qualifications of degree level, academic, and 
professional in equivalence.  
3. Variable “Age”; is presented in years and 
expected to show a linear relation between the age 
of executive directors and their hierarchical position 
as per index cluster. 
4. Variable “Nationality”; measures nationality 
diversity amongst executive directors in each index 
cluster and is estimated with a Herfindahl 
nationality diversity index (board diversity index). It 
is calculated as follows: 
 
                       )              )                           )             )  (1) 
 
A lower value of the nationality diversity index 
will indicate more diversity in boards. 
5. Variable “Gender”; similar to the above, 
gauges gender diversity amongst executive directors 
in boards of AIM, FTSE SmallCap, FTSE 250, and 
FTSE 100 companies. The variable is estimated with 
Herfindahl Gender Diversity index and is calculated 
as follows: 
 
                   )              )                       )             )  (2) 
 
A lower value of gender diversity index will 
hence represent higher gender diversity in boards. 
Table 3, Panel A-D, shows the descriptive 
statistics for the personal attributes of executive 
directors across indices clusters (FTSE 100, 
FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap, and AIM) on a year by year 
basis. Clearly, one can note two stable trends that 
persist across all four panels. The number of 
network connections and executive age increased up 
until 2016 within each index cluster. Interestingly, 
the requirement for education seems to have 
become more important for FTSE SmallCap and AIM 
firms. However, a slight inverse trend can be 
observed for FTSE 100 companies. 
In accordance with our assumptions, we 
observe a difference in managerial traits across 
index groups. Thus, the average (mean) levels of 
managerial characteristics across index clusters over 
the sample period show the importance of Network 
size for executive directors in FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 firms. Thus, the network connection of 
FTSE 100 board members is almost twice the 
network size of FTSE 250 directors (1,649 versus 
836) and about 3 times higher versus FTSE SmallCap 
and AIM firms (450 and 573, respectively).  
Education is the second most important factor 
which significantly differentiates executive directors 
across index clusters. The mean figures show that 
the requirement for education increases while 
directors progress from AIM towards FTSE 100 
firms. So, on average, executive directors hold 2.16 
degrees when in FTSE 100, 1.59 in FTSE 250, and 
1.21 and 1.08 in FTSE SmallCap and AIM 
respectively. “Age” for the existing board is 
relatively constant across the index clusters. The 
average age of an executive director in FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 firms is 52 years old.  
The variables Nationality and Gender have 
estimated with the Herfindahl index indicate low 
diversity in UK Boardrooms, with 0.86 and 0.95 on 
average across all index groups respectively. Looking 
at the sample in more detail we can highlight that 
women represent only close to 6 percent of the 
board, with the highest percentage observed in 
FTSE 100 firms and the lowest in FTSE SmallCap (6.3 
versus 5 percent correspondingly).  
A similar tendency can be seen for diversity 
according to Nationality. Hence, non-British 
executive directors retain just above 16.5 percent of 
the board. FTSE 100 firms are the most 
internationally diverse (28.5 percent of non-British) 
while FTSE SmallCap firms‟ figures are just above 
10.5 percent.  
By and large, we can state that based on the 
average personal attributes of executive directors 
across all index clusters a „typical‟ profile of an 
executive director on the board of a UK financial 
firm during the time period analysed is a 52-year-old 
British male with more than one-degree level 
qualification (1.5) and with an extensive network of 
director connections (877 on average). 
 







2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Panel A: FTSE 100 
Network 1,649 1,654 1,617 1,606 1,859 1,759 1,653 1,759 1,675 1,664 1,663 1,744 1,555 1,465 
Age 51.6 53.0 52.9 52.4 52.5 51.6 51.7 52.4 51.7 51.4 50.9 50.2 50.9 49.8 
Education 2.16 1.86 1.95 1.93 2.10 1.98 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.22 2.37 2.56 2.57 2.44 
Nationality 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.79 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.80 
Gender 0.93 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.97 
No. of firms 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 
Panel B: FTSE 250 
Network 836 946 954 929 890 806 808 878 845 841 848 635 584 523 
Age 51.2 55.1 54.2 53.3 52.3 51.5 51.3 50.7 50.1 50.0 50.1 50.0 50.1 49.3 
Education 1.59 1.53 1.60 1.54 1.68 1.63 1.71 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.54 1.47 1.54 1.60 
Nationality 0.85 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.86 
Gender 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 
No. of firms 27 23 18 24 26 26 26 26 25 25 24 23 22 22 
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2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Panel C: FTSE SmallCap 
Network 450 646 499 632 555 534 501 510 365 403 442 435 238 216 
Age 53.9 56.1 55.7 54.5 54.5 53.8 52.8 53.6 52.5 52.2 51.9 51.1 51.5 51.6 
Education 1.21 1.27 1.24 1.27 1.15 1.21 1.22 1.28 1.08 1.08 1.19 1.13 1.23 0.98 
Nationality 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 
Gender 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.95 1.00 
No. of firms 17 16 9 15 15 15 15 15 14 12 12 12 11 9 
Panel D: AIM 
Network 573 616 694 661 621 618 582 581 517 547 516 478 389 333 
Age 50.5 53.3 52.4 51.7 52.1 51.3 50.3 49.9 49.8 49.0 49.2 48.7 48.1 48.7 
Education 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.16 1.17 1.10 1.10 1.08 1.17 1.14 1.15 1.07 1.03 1.05 
Nationality 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.91 
Gender 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.94 
No. of firms 71 48 29 55 60 64 68 66 63 64 60 48 37 26 
 
3.4. Difference in means rank test 
 
To assess whether the differences in managerial 
attributes across index clusters are statistically 
significant, we perform the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test, year by year, and for all years. 
We maintain a null hypothesis that the average 
values of manager attributes in two independent 
samples (in this case firms in two different indices) 
are the same against an alternative hypothesis that a 
particular population tends to have larger/smaller 
values than the other. Table 4, Panel A shows that 
FTSE 100 managers have a statistically significant 
larger number of network connections, degree 
qualifications, and more internationally diverse in 
comparison to FTSE 250 firms average (statistically 
significant at 1 percent level).  
This difference gets even stronger when 
analysed versus FTSE SmallCap and AIM firms. There 
is an interesting and distinctive difference in age, 
nationality, and gender when all index clusters are 
compared to FTSE SmallCap. Their executive 
directors are, on average, older and the boards are 
less nationality and gender diverse (statistically 
significant at 1 and 5 percent level). Overall, we can 
state a distinctive difference among mean executive 
attributes across index groups. When the results are 
analysed on a year by year basis, the observed 
pattern persists with some statistical significance 
and for network and education, in particular. 
 
Table 4. Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
 
 Network Age Education Nationality Gender 
Panel A: All years 
FTSE 100 – FTSE 250 -9.416*** -2.018** -7.112*** 3.153*** 0.124 
FTSE 100 – FTSE SmallCap -11.371** 2.160** -10.301*** 6.149*** 2.511** 
FTSE 100 – AIM -13.241*** -3.886*** -12.514*** 5.761*** 0.968 
FTSE 250 – FTSE SmallCap -7.672*** 4.161*** -4.984*** 3.808*** 2.737*** 
FTSE 250 – AIM -10.159*** -2.723*** -8.823*** 2.709*** 1.211 
FTSE SmallCap – AIM 0.639 -6.147*** -2.117** -2.035** -2.114** 
Panel A: 2004 
FTSE 100 – FTSE 250 -3.046*** -0.109 -2.492** 0.803 -0.789 
FTSE 100 – FTSE SmallCap -3.400*** 0.751 -2.753*** 2.066** 1.000 
FTSE 100 – AIM -3.737*** -0.868 -3.252*** 1.904* -0.372 
FTSE 250 – FTSE SmallCap -2.307*** 0.871 -2.389** 1.275 1.529 
FTSE 250 – AIM -2.504*** -0.755 -2.665*** 0.885 0.562 
FTSE SmallCap – AIM 0.075 -1.019 0.076 -0.661 -1.230 
Panel A: 2008 
FTSE 100 – FTSE 250 -2.921*** -1.407 -1.968** 0.982 -1.217 
FTSE 100 – FTSE SmallCap -3.429*** 0.198 -3.408*** 2.636*** 1.095 
FTSE 100 – AIM -3.921*** -1.779* -3.707*** 2.592 -0.641 
FTSE 250 – FTSE SmallCap -2.482** 1.250 -2.087** 1.600 1.995** 
FTSE 250 – AIM -2.976*** -1.046 -2.697*** 1.416 1.178 
FTSE SmallCap – AIM 0.456 -1.824** 0.122 -0.847 -1.537 
Panel A: 2012 
FTSE 100 – FTSE 250 -2.826*** -0.513 -1.426 0.117 0.381 
FTSE 100 – FTSE SmallCap -2.884*** 1.138 -2.532** 1.231 0.982 
FTSE 100 – AIM -3.621*** -0.965 -3.244 0.850 0.559 
FTSE 250 – FTSE SmallCap -2.192** 1.489 -1.298 1.697* 0.762 
FTSE 250 – AIM -3.205*** -0.352 -2.555** 1.211 0.271 
FTSE SmallCap – AIM 0.019 -1.938** -0.624 -0.863 -0.680 
Panel A: 2016 
FTSE 100 – FTSE 250 -2.003** 0.490 -1.411 1.693* -0.645 
FTSE 100 – FTSE SmallCap -2.530** 1.425 -2.057** 1.308 -1.141 
FTSE 100 – AIM -3.392*** -0.247 -2.591 1.779* -0.917 
FTSE 250 – FTSE SmallCap -1.574 0.757 -0.628 -0.303 -0.968 
FTSE 250 – AIM -2.714*** -1.143 -1.608 -0.041 -0.637 
FTSE SmallCap – AIM -0.344 -2.017** -1.011 0.315 0.480 
Note: Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann–Whitney) test is applied to assess whether the differences in managerial attributes across index 
clusters are statistically significant. The analysis is performed on a year by year basis and for all years (as the outcomes do not vary 
significantly across the years, the table displays the significance for the managerial characteristics in each cluster for every four 
years). Superscripts indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (***) percent levels. 
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4. MODEL AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Ordered Probit Model 
 
Our main question is to analyse whether some 
managers‟ attributes may increase their probability 
of moving towards upper echelon boards, to identify 
the characteristics that are the most valued by the 
employers and, as discussed previously, lead to 
higher executive pay. To conduct this empirical 
analysis, we utilise an ordered probit model 
(Ordered outcomes). This approach not only allows 
explicitly for the discreteness of possible index 
group transitions, but also for the fact that index 
groups possess a natural ordering from the largest 
to the smallest by market capitalisation firms. This 
model relates the index clusters (the latent variable) 
to observed explanatory variables through an 
unobserved continuous linking variable. The index 
categories map on to a partition of the range of the 
unobserved variable, which is in turn a linear 
function of the observed explanatory variable. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The certain personal 
characteristics increase the probability of executive 
directors moving upwards (from AIM to FTSE 100). 
The underlying relationship can be described 
as follows: 
 
                       (3) 
 
where the dependent variable Index category* is the 
exact but unobserved variable, which represents 
ordered outcomes, index clusters (FTSE 100, 
FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap, and AIM): rank 4 is 
assigned for executives of FTSE 100 firms; rank 3 for 
the executives of FTSE 250; rank 2 and rank 1 is for 
directors in FTSE SmallCap and AIM firms, 
respectively. Here, x is the vector of independent 
variables comprising of cross-sectional data for 
firms and time-series data, such as director 
attributes  is the vector of regression parameters to 
be estimated, while   is a disturbance term that has 
a standard normal distribution. 
Since we cannot directly observe Index 
category*, we observe the categories of response 
using the following equation: 
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Here, the      are unknown parameters which 
define a series of ranges collectively into which the 
latent variable may fall (partition points). Like the  , 
the      are to be estimated. 
The ordered probit model is hence applied to 
determine the probability of executive directors to 
be a part/belong to boards in different index 
clusters due to their personal attributes. 
Table 5 presents the outcomes. The evidence 
supports our previous findings and confirms that 
network and education are the most important 
attributes for career progression (also associates 
with executive pay as per Figure 1). The results are 
displayed per year and by the average for all years 
(first column). The partition points are presented in 
the bottom half of the table. As it can be seen the 
results for education and network connections are 
robust and statistically significant across years.  
Figures 3 and 4 below show the marginal effect 
of education and network on the probability of 
career development from the AIM market towards 
FTSE 350 firms and further up to FTSE 100 boards. 
One can observe that with each above-average 
educational degree, the likelihood of being employed 
by FTSE 350 firms increases by around 20 percent. 
Moreover, it improves the chances of becoming a 
member of the FTSE 100 board by 5-10 percent, 
depending on the years. To continue, an increase of 
100 network connections raises the probability of 
being hired by FTSE 350 by about 10 percent and the 
likelihood to join the board of FTSE 100 by 5 
percent. 
 
Figure 3. Marginal effects of education: FTSE 100 and FTSE 350 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the marginal effect of education on the probability of career development from the FTSE SmallCap and 
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Marginal effects  - Education 
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Figure 4. Marginal effects of the network: FTSE 100 and FTSE 350 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the marginal effect of the network on the probability of career development from the FTSE SmallCap and 
AIM market towards FTSE 350 firms and further up to FTSE 100 boards. 
 
4.2. New entries and exits 
 
We claim that the impact of personal characteristics 
on hiring decisions and career progression from AIM 
to FTSE 100 firms should be even stronger when the 
traits of only new directors are analysed. At first, we 
wish to see whether the personal attributes of newly 
appointed are different in comparison to the ones 
who left. Thus, we would expect to see similar or 
even stronger evidence of the importance of 
personal attributes, such as network and education, 
on career progression. 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): The personal attributes of 
directors entering and leaving the boards in 
companies of different size are different. 
Table 6 outlays summary statistics describing 
the number of executive managers‟ entries and exits 
per each index group (FTSE 100, FTSE 250, 
FTSE SmallCap, and AIM). The information is 
comprised of total and year per year data. For the 
whole time period, we analyse the personal 
attributes of 474 newly appointed directors and the 
characteristics of 523 directors who left the board 
(32 of them were in retirement age). Overall, these 
figures represent 60% and 66.20% of our sample, 
respectively. As can be seen, the highest fraction of 
newly appointees is centred in the AIM category, 287 
executive directors.  
Table 7 Panel A-D describes the summary 
statistics of executive directors‟ personal traits in 
each index category. As can be noticed, the average 
characteristics of the new entries differ from the 
total sample. A „typical‟ new director is younger, on 
average a 48-year-old, and much better connected 
(1,058 network links versus 877 previously 
indicated). New executive directors bring more 
heterogeneity into UK boardrooms and, on average, 
are more gender and nationality diverse.  
By and large, we can state that personal 
attributes of new directors employed by FTSE 100 
stand out from the rest of the index categories. 
Their new appointees are older, the most connected, 
have close to two degrees on average, and have a 
more diverse ethnic background. The female 
representation on the board is above FTSE SmallCap 
and AIM and almost at the level of FTSE 250.  
One may also notice here that diversity pattern 
for executive directors of FTSE SmallCap firms 
seems slightly different versus other clusters and 
shows the lowest values of the board diversity index 
- 0.81 for nationality and 0.95 for gender diversity. 
Thus, for the whole time period from 2004 to 2016, 
only 4 non-British members over 40 years of age in 
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Table 5. Ordered Probit Model 
 
 


















































































































































No. of firms 125 97 65 104 111 115 119 117 112 111 106 92 79 66 
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.0718 0.1096 0.0780 0.1052 0.0812 0.0921 0.0960 0.0956 0.1240 0.1022 0.1456 0.1713 0.1749 
FTSE SmallCap 1.4191 1.8937 1.9535 0.8464 1.0519 0.8052 1.7566 1.6855 1.8368 1.772 1.9492 2.0441 2.5625 0.9982 
FTSE 250 1.8439 2.3601 2.3612 1.2641 1.4573 1.1925 2.1403 2.0751 2.2123 2.1119 2.2886 2.4424 2.9956 1.4161 
FTSE 100 2.9339 3.3371 3.4341 2.2551 2.5703 2.2193 3.1671 3.1104 3.2638 3.2291 3.345 3.6814 4.3226 2.8830 
Note: The table presents the outcomes of the ordered probit model. The model is applied to determine the probability of executive directors to be a part/belong to boards in different index clusters due to 
their personal attributes. The analysis is performed on a year by year basis and for all years. Superscripts indicate statist ical significance at 0.01 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (***) percent levels; t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. 
 
 






2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
FTSE 100 56 4 0 5 7 4 4 2 3 6 4 5 5 7 
FTSE 250 91 2 0 4 6 7 10 9 3 10 8 15 4 13 
FTSE SmallCap 40 2 0 4 4 4 4 1 5 3 1 6 4 2 
AIM 287 10 4 17 24 17 32 27 10 28 41 43 25 9 
Total entries 474 18 4 30 41 32 50 39 21 47 54 69 38 31 




2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
FTSE 100 72 2 3 6 5 5 8 3 4 9 4 8 8 7 
FTSE 250 134 4 4 6 20 13 5 11 14 17 10 11 7 12 
FTSE SmallCap 48 1 1 5 3 3 8 3 9 5 1 2 5 2 
AIM 269 7 2 15 37 19 31 36 22 33 20 32 8 7 
Total exits 523 14 10 32 65 40 52 53 49 64 35 53 28 28 
Exits/Total 66.20% 7.00% 3.13% 9.76% 19.12% 10.87% 14.61% 15.41% 13.35% 16.58% 10.45% 16.30% 10.03% 12.28% 
Note: The table outlays summary statistics describing the number of executive managers’ entries and exits per each index group (FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap, and AIM). The information is 
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Table 7. Average attributes of executive directors (new entries) 
 
 
Variables ALL years 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Panel A: Average director FTSE 100 
Network 1,777 2,432 - 1,306 2,296 1,986 1,355 1,834 2,078 1,751 2,600 1,705 718 1.556 
Age 49.5 50.5 - 49.2 52.3 50.5 44.8 49.5 50.7 50.7 50.3 47.8 52 45.9 
Education 1.89 1.75 - 1.20 2.14 1.75 2.25 2.5 1.67 1.83 1.00 2.40 2.60 1.71 
Nationality 0.54 0.38 - 1.00 0.55 0.63 0.63 0.50 0.56 0.50 1.00 0.44 0.44 0.76 
Gender 0.86 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.44 0.76 
No. of managers 56 4 0 5 7 4 4 2 3 6 4 5 5 7 
Panel B: Average director FTSE 250 
Network 1,050 3,954 - 2,022 701 367 1,023. 1,022 927 1,566 1,759 810 1,346 254 
Age 46.8 52.0 - 48.5 51.2 44.1 47.0 49.3 48.7 46.0 45.0 46.1 47.5 45.0 
Education 1.60 1.00 - 1.50 1.33 0.57 2.30 2.00 0.67 2.00 1.75 1.47 1.5 1.62 
Nationality 0.59 1.00 - 1.00 0.50 0.55 0.40 0.63 0.56 0.52 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.61 
Gender 0.85 1.00 - 1.00 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.78 1.0 0.63 0.86 
No. of managers 91 2 0 4 6 7 10 9 3 10 8 15 4 13 
Panel C: Average director FTSE SmallCap 
Network 872 31 - 1,251 985 1,490 1,498 3,455 188 59 923 1,044 427 230 
Age 48.4 48 - 51.8 45.5 53.0 44.5 46.0 49.4 52.3 51.0 49.5 40.8 49.0 
Education 1.10 1.00 - 1.50 0.75 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.80 1.00 3.00 1.33 1.00 0.00 
Nationality 0.81 1.00 - 0.38 0.63 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Gender 0.95 0.50 - 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
No. of managers 40 2 0 4 4 4 4 1 5 3 1 6 4 2 
Panel D: Average director AIM 
Network 534 773 104 583 502 474 604 360 167 539 517 601 670 613 
Age 46.3 49.7 50.8 47.6 50.0 48.0 47.9 46.1 43.9 43.5 46.4 45.6 43.8 42.3 
Education 1.15 1.30 0.25 0.94 1.71 1.06 1.13 1.07 1.00 1.21 1.00 1.21 0.92 1.67 
Nationality 0.77 0.66 1.00 0.69 0.80 0.89 0.72 0.67 0.82 0.80 0.73 0.82 0.85 1.00 
Gender 0.89 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.86 0.77 0.87 1.00 0.80 
No. of managers 287 10 4 17 24 17 32 27 10 28 41 43 25 9 
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To investigate whether the personal attributes 
of directors entering and leaving the boards of 
FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap, and AIM are 
different, we perform a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We 
thus apply a null hypothesis that average director 
attributes for those entering and leaving per each 
index cluster are the same, with an alternative 
hypothesis that there are manager traits that 
differentiate new arrivals across all market index 
categories. The results for all the years are displayed 
in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Wilcoxon rank-sum test (entries/exits) 
 
 Network Age Education Nationality Gender 
FTSE 100 -0.569 3.992*** 1.558 -0.124 0.304 
FTSE 250 -2.416*** 5.992*** 0.806 0.121 0.352 
FTSE SmallCap -1.794* 2.257** -0.598 0.269 1.095 
AIM -0.820 3.378*** -0.078 -0.034 -0.044 
Note: Wilcoxon rank-sum test is conducted to investigate whether the personal attributes of directors entering and leaving the 
boards of FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap, and AIM are different. Superscripts indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (*), 0.05 (**) 
and 0.10 (***) percent levels. 
 
The outcomes show that the factor which 
differentiates new entries and exits is age 
(statistically significant at 1 percent level for all 
indices). In addition, new directors in FTSE 250 and 
FTSE SmallCap are better connected in comparison 
to the ones who left. The results for other variables, 
such as education, nationality, and gender, are not 
statistically significant, entailing that the rest of the 
attributes of those who came in are not different 
from the directors who have moved out. 
For further clarification on personal traits, we 
apply the Ordered Probit Model only for newly 
appointed directors. As per section 3.1 of this paper, 
we assign rank 4 for new executives of FTSE 100 
firms, rank 3 for those recruited by FTSE 250, rank 2 
and rank 1 for FTSE SmallCap and AIM‟s new entries, 
respectively.  
Table 9 lays out the results. As we may note, 
there are four main characteristics that increase the 
probability of new managers moving upwards (from 
AIM to FTSE 100): network, age, education, and 
nationality (statistically significant at 1 and 5 
percent level). These results are in line with our 
previous findings and confirm that new FTSE 100 
members are older, most qualified, more nationality 
diverse and have the highest number of network 
connections. 
 


















No.of managers 474 
Pseudo R2 0.1091 
FTSE SmallCap 1.3917 
FTSE 250 1.6605 
FTSE 100 2.4870 
Note: Ordered Probit Model is performed only for newly 
appointed directors. The model is applied to identify the most 
valued personal attributes that drive career progression (also 
corresponds to remuneration packages). Superscripts indicate 
statistical significance at 0.01 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (***) percent 




4.3. New entries and existing board 
 
Previous academic studies have suggested a possible 
bias in the appointment of new directors. For 
instance, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2012) provide 
evidence that firms appoint independent directors 
who are overly sympathetic to management. The 
findings of Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) indicate 
that the CEO‟s attempt to bias new board 
appointments in their favour. In addition to this 
empirical evidence, we examine in our paper 
whether the personal characteristics of the newly 
appointed executive directors are similar to the 
existing board or, in fact, the skill set of the new 
members is different. To perform this analysis, we 
construct a matching sample that includes only the 
firms with newly appointed directors and compares 
those to the rest of the board. Our matching sample 
includes the data on 474 new directors. 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): The personal traits of the 
new entries are different from the existing board. 
Similar to Table 8, to control for the differences 
in personal characteristics of the new and existing 
board members, we apply Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
with a null hypothesis that average personal traits of 
the new entries and the existing board are the same 
in comparison to an alternative hypothesis that 
some attributes of the new arrivals are different 
across all index clusters. The analysis is conducted 
for all years and Table 10 presents the outcomes, 
where the average values for new entries in 
comparison with the average board by attribute are 
displayed in parenthesis. 
The findings confirm our previous statement 
and show that the personal characteristics of new 
directors are different from the existing boards. 
Overall, the new entries are younger, more 
connected, and more nationality and gender diverse 
(statistically significant at 1 percent level). In 
addition to the mean values, we can highlight the 
finding that FTSE 100 boards, including new entries, 
have the largest network size, the most nationality 
and gender diverse and educated (even though the 
newly appointed have fewer degrees in comparison 
with the existing board on average). More non-British 
members are among new arrivals (0.73 in contrast to 
0.78 as per Herfindahl index, statistically significant 
at 5 percent level). Besides being younger, the 
FTSE 250 new entries have more men amongst the 
newly appointed; however, the overall gender 
diversity figures are the lowest versus other groups, 
0.923/0.919 statistically significant at 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 10. Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
 
 

































































Note: Wilcoxon rank-sum test is conducted to control for the differences in the personal characteristics of the new and existing 
board members. The analysis is performed for all years. The average values for new entries in comparison with the average board by 
attribute are displayed in parenthesis. Superscripts indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (***) percent levels. 
 
The AIM new members are the youngers, better 
connected and diverse (including both female and 
non-British members) versus the existing board. As 
stated previously, the results for the FTSE SmallCap 
cluster are different from the other index categories. 
The new entries‟ characteristics do not deviate much 
from the existing boards, except for being younger.  
To complement our analysis, we examine the 
relationship between the personal characteristics of 
the board and the personal traits of the newly hired 
and estimate whether the personal traits of new 
directors are influenced by the historical board 
attributes. To conduct this analysis, we run a 
standard least-square linear regression written 
below: 
 
                                                                      (5) 
 
where i represents index, r the firm and t year. The 
attributes of newly hired per index cluster, firm, and 
year are estimated in relation to the board 
characteristics per index cluster, a firm with a time 
lag of one year.  
This cross-sectional analysis is conducted for 
the whole time period 2004-2016. Table 11 reports 
obtained beta coefficients. 
 
 
Table 11. Attributes of new directors versus the existing board 
 
























































Note: A standard least-square linear regression                                                                       
is applied to estimate the relationship between the personal characteristics of the board and the personal traits of the newly hired, 
where i represents index, r the firm, and t year. The attributes of newly hired per index cluster, firm, and year are estimated in relation 
to the board characteristics per index cluster, a firm with a time lag of one year. This cross-sectional analysis is conducted for the 
whole time period from 2004 to 2016. Superscripts indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (***) percent levels. 
 
The results show a positive relationship 
between all the personal attributes examined of the 
existing board and the newly appointed directors 
across all index clusters. Coefficients above one 
indicate that firms hire managers with better 
attributes than the board average. For instance, for 
each average 100 board network connections the 
new director hired by FTSE 250 has 121 network 
links (larger network size). However, there are 
examples when the required personal traits are 
below the mean figures of the board. For example, 
we can state that mature/older boards tend to hire 
new directors who are older; however, as the age of 
the board goes up the age of the new entries 
becomes proportionally below the average age of the 
board members. These findings are robust 
(statistically significant at 1 percent level) and 
consistent across all index categories.  
Interesting results can be seen for the variables 
nationality and gender. Thus, keeping in mind that 
both are measured by the Herfindahl index where 
the percentage of British and male per firm is the 
driving force, statistically significant above one 
figure indicates that less diverse boards tend to 
employ even more British male members. A slightly 
better tendency can be observed for gender diversity 
in FTSE 250 (0.8789) and nationality diversity in AIM 
firms (0.9187), statistically significant at 1 percent 
level.  
In addition, we can highlight that, on average, 
better educated and connected boardrooms bring 
more educated and higher connected new members 
(1.0056 and 1.0497, correspondingly, significant at 1 
percent level). Taking into consideration that the 
existing board of FTSE 100 is the most connected 
versus other index groups the fact that the network 
size of new directors is proportionally below the 
average board network links is not surprising (0.8892).  
As robustness checks, in addition to OLS, we 
conduct similar tests using Quantile regression 
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which is more robust to non-normal errors and 
outliers and provides a richer characterisation of the 
data (allows considering the impact of a covariate on 
the entire distribution, not just its conditional 
mean). The results obtained from the quintile 
regression are qualitatively similar to the ones 
estimated with OLS (the results are available upon 
request). 
 
4.4. Financial crisis 
 
Parker (2017) states that talent pool can change 
when business addresses various challenges. We 
believe that during the time of financial turmoil 
board characteristics may change as successful 
leadership and decision-making boards may require 
different sets of personal skills. Thus, we analyse 
the effect of the financial crisis on UK board 
attributes and examine whether the set of executive 
characteristics after the crisis has changed in 
comparison with the pre-2008 trend.  
Hypothesis 9 (H9): The personal attributes of 
new directors have changed after the financial crisis. 
We conduct a similar to Table 11 linear OLS 
regression where we analyse the relationship 
between the personal attributes of newly appointed 
directors and the traits of the existing boards before 
and after the financial crisis. To assess the impact of 
the crisis on personal characteristics of new 
executives, we split the sample into two groups: 
before the financial crisis (up to 2007 inclusive) and 
after for the period 2008-2016. Table 12 presents 
the results (the results from the Quantile regression 
are qualitatively similar and available upon request). 
 
Table 12. Attributes of new directors versus existing board (pre- and post-financial crisis) 
 
Average 
Panel A: Pre-2008 






















































No. of observations 192 21 40 13 118 























































Note: A standard linear OLS regression                                                                       is 
applied to analyse the relationship between the personal attributes of newly appointed directors and the traits of the existing boards 
before and after the financial crisis. To assess the impact of the crisis on personal characteristics of new executives, the sample is split 
into two groups: before the financial crisis (up to 2007 inclusive) and after for the period 2008-2016. The attributes of newly hired per 
index cluster, firm, and year are estimated in relation to the board characteristics per index cluster, a firm with a time lag of one year. 
Superscripts indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (***) percent levels. 
 
Our findings show that even though the 
relationship between the existing board 
characteristics and the attributes of the newly hired 
are still positive (in some cases less proportional to 
the average of the board), one can observe a change 
in the skill-set after 2008. Hence, executive directors 
appointed after 2008 are on average older and more 
educated (more degrees) versus the existing board, 
except the FTSE SmallCap group. After the crisis, the 
marginal impact of education for those employed by 
FTSE 100 has doubled.  
These results are consistent with Berger, Kick, 
and Schaeck‟s (2014) evidence that older and highly 
educated executive directors reduce the risk of 
financial institutions. After the crisis FTSE 100, 
FTSE 250 and AIM boardrooms appear to be more 
gender diverse (lower Herfindahl index coefficients); 
however, men executives mostly dominate. Based on 
the sample figures only 1 woman versus 34 men was 
hired by FTSE 100 (2.85%), 4 women rather than 47 
men were employed by FTSE 250 (7.84%), 1 woman 
in comparison to 26 men joined the board of 
FTSE SmallCap (3.7%), and 7 women in contrast to 
162 men became a part of AIM boardrooms (4.14%). 
The highest percentage of women in FTSE 250 and 
AIM was employed in the year 20082. These results 
may be explained by the different skill-set required 
during the time of turmoil and may reflect previous 
literature on female risk aversion (Carter, Franco & 
Gine, 2017; Martin, Nishikawa, & Williams, 2009). 
Based on the nationality diversity figures, one can 
notice that, excepting the AIM category, boardrooms 
have become less nationality diverse. This finding 
means that more British directors have been hired 
after the financial crisis.  
Nevertheless, even though the nationality 
diversity figures have declined, the percentage of 
international members on boards is much higher in 
comparison to the percentages for gender diversity. 
Thus, after 2008, new other than British directors 
represent 28.57 percent and 27.45 percent of FTSE 
100 and FTSE 250 boards versus 14.81% and 14.20% 
of FTSE SmallCap and AIM boards, respectively. 
Thereby, similar to Hahn and Lasfer (2016), we 
confirm that larger boards are more internationally 
diverse. 
                                                          
2 These results are available upon request. 





This study proposes a new approach to examining 
executive remuneration and manager traits 
disaggregated by market index peer clusters. It 
allows us to analyse the personal characteristics of 
the members of financial institutions‟ boardrooms in 
the UK and identify the attributes that drive career 
progression from the AIM market to FTSE 100. In 
response to the concerns highlighted in the FRC 
(2015, 2016), in this work we provide more clarity on 
the board composition and the executive traits that 
differentiate top managers across various groups of 
boards that we cluster by market capitalisation. Our 
analysis has been performed for 125 unique 
financial firms and 790 unique executive directors, 
which we divide into four categories in accordance 
with the major UK market indices (FTSE 100, 
FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap, and AIM firms). The study 
is conducted for the 2004-2016 time period. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first work that has 
examined the personal characteristics of the existing 
boards and newly appointed directors disaggregated 
by the index cluster they serve. This approach has 
thus allowed us to look at the traits which 
differentiate FTSE 100 top managers from the 
executives of the FTSE SmallCap and AIM market 
and identify the most important attributes driving 
hiring decisions. The examination is conducted for 
deep-level attributes such as network size and 
education, looking into surface-level diversity 
features like age, gender, and nationality.  
The results show increasing importance of 
network connections and education on career 
progression and executive pay. Thus, on average, 
FTSE 100 executive directors are three times better 
connected and two times more educated in 
comparison to FTSE SmallCap and AIM board 
members. In addition, top echelon firms are more 
diversified in terms of nationality and gender of new 
managers (Hahn & Lasfer, 2016), while a higher 
position is associated with greater age. 
The new executive directors tend to be younger 
and better connected (1058 network links versus 
877 connections, on average, for existing boards). 
We document that four main characteristics, such as 
network, age, education, and nationality, are 
important determinants that drive new entries‟ 
career growth from AIM to FTSE 100 boards 
(statistically significant at 1 and 5 percent level). By 
and large, FTSE 100 new members are older, the 
most connected, educated, and nationality diverse, 
while the female representation almost at the level 
of FTSE 250 and above FTSE SmallCap and AIM. In 
contrast, FTSE SmallCap new appointees do not 
deviate much from the existing board, except in 
being younger, and on average are the least 
nationality and gender diverse. 
Furthermore, we document a change in the new 
managers‟ skillset after the financial crisis. The new 
directors appointed after 2008 are on average older, 
more educated and gender diverse, with the highest 
number of women hired during the period of the 
financial crisis (consistent with the literature on risk 
aversion, Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014; Carter, 
Franco, & Gine, 2017). However, it is important to 
note that, overall, the gender index percentage 
change is still tiny and male boards mainly 
dominate.  
Our results on nationality diversity are of 
significant importance for policymakers and 
regulators. We show that, except in the AIM 
category, UK boards have become less nationality 
diverse after the financial crisis; in other words, 
more British executive directors have been 
employed. This evidence is consistent with the 
concern raised in Parker (2017). 
Our evidence contributes to the literature on 
managerial traits and adds to the strand of academic 
research examining the determinants of executive 
pay. The proposed novel approach of analysing 
managerial attributes by splitting them into index 
categories allows them to identify personal 
attributes important for career progression and can 
be applied in further research for remuneration 
benchmarking. By and large, this study has 
regulatory and practical implications important for 
the UK‟s corporate governance as it provides 
insights on the UK board composition and 
managerial traits. We can highlight that even though, 
age, education, and network are crucially important 
for a successful member of the board, our study 
shows that despite FRC UK guidance British top 
boards are not nationality and gender diverse. Thus, 
considering the currently changing demographic 
profile of Britain and the international skill pull set 
required to compete in the constantly changing 
market environment, government interference or 
new policy measures are required to bring more 
diversity to the British boards. 
It is important to note that our analysis has 
limitations as we only utilise personal characteristics 
of board members based on the data provided by 
Boardex. A significant strand of academic literature 
highlights the importance of culture on firm 
decisions and performance (Fiordelisi & Ricci, 2014, 
Frijns, Dodd, & Cimerova, 2016; Belghitar, Mateus, & 
Moro, 2016; Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li, & Shao, 
2017). Hence, we believe, that it would be beneficial 
to further investigate diversity in corporate boards 
with the inclusion of culture as an additional 
variable. In addition, this study could be extended to 
other countries to assess the extent of board 
diversity among companies of different hierarchy 
and the impact of such diversity on firm 
performance. Our novel approach of using market 
indices to define managerial peer groups can be 
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